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HIS paper studies the economic effects of liberalisation in the telecommunica-
tions sector on the Turkish economy. Since Turkey is trying to liberalise the
telecommunications sector by following the EU approach to liberalisation, we
consider in Section 2 the regulatory regimes in the telecommunications sectors
of the EU and Turkey. In Section 3 we make use of the empirical studies on the





 equivalent of barriers to the telecommunications services sector
in Turkey, and derive estimates of the welfare effects of adopting the EU rules
and regulations in the Turkish telecommunications sector. Section 4 concludes.
 
2. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN THE EU AND TURKEY
 
Since its inception in the mid-1980s, EU telecommunications policy has
focused on two main objectives: economic efficiency and guarantee of universal
service. In 1987 the Commission issued a Green Paper which set out a Community-
wide programme for action in the telecommunications sector in pursuit of these
objectives. The achievement of these aims has been pursued through the applica-
tion of a set of complementary principles: market liberalisation and harmonisation
of conditions for a common regulatory framework.
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 which obliged Member States to remove special or
exclusive rights relating to the importation, marketing, connection, bringing into
service and maintenance of telecommunication terminal equipment. The Commission
Directive 90/388/EEC (Services Directive) initiated the opening to competition
of the telecommunications services market by providing for the removal and
exclusive rights granted by Member States to Telecommunications Organisations
for the supply of value-added services by the end of 1990 and data services by
1 January, 1993. Remaining monopolies within the telecommunications services,
which continued as ‘reserved services’ after the implementation of the Services
Directive were lifted through the adoption of Satellite Directive (94/46/EC),
Cable Directive (95/51/EC) and Mobile Directive (96/2/EC). Thereafter, the
Commission adopted the Full Competition Directive (96/19/EC) in February
1996, taking the final step in the liberalisation of the sector. The latter Directive
called on Member States to take the necessary steps in order to ensure that markets
were fully open by 1 January, 1998. Since 1998, the EU has fully competitive
telecommunications markets in all Member States but five. Portugal, Spain,
Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg had derogations. As recently as 2002 the EU
introduced the Framework, Authorisation, Access, and Universal Service Directives
and Local Loop Unbundling Regulation, the purpose of which is to provide a
common regulatory framework and competition principles and practices for the
electronic communications sector in the EU comprising telecommunications,






Commission Directive 88/301/EEC of 16 May, 1988, on competition in the markets in telecom-




The Framework Directive (2002/21/EC) emphasises the independence of the national regulatory
authority (NRA) which has to be guaranteed by member states, the right of appeal against NRA




 regulation to be imposed on significant market power, market
definition and market analysis procedures, and NRA’s duties to resolve disputes within four months
when negotiations on access and interconnections fail. It applies to all telecommunications
networks (fixed or wireless) as well as broadcast networks (terrestrial, satellite and cable), so that
equivalent rules will apply to all these networks. On the other hand, the Authorisation Directive
(2002/20/EC) abolishes individual licensing and moves to a system of general authorisation accord-
ing to which older licensing schemes for different telecommunications services, i.e. public voice
and data providers, and facilities-based and resale providers have been removed. The access to
the network elements and associated facilities is regulated by the Access Directive (2002/19/EC)
and the Unbundled Access to the Local Loop Regulation (No. 2887/2000). While the Access
Directive establishes the rights and obligations of operators regarding interconnections and/or
access, and defines the objectives of and the procedures for the NRAs on a mandatory access scheme,
Regulation No. 2887/2000 asserts that notified operators are obliged to meet reasonable requests
for unbundled access to the local loop under transparent, fair and non-discriminatory conditions.




as the provision of a defined minimum set
of services to all end-users at affordable prices. The EU sees universal service as an obligation on
its Member States. However, care is taken not to distort the market mechanism while safeguarding
the public interest.
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On the other hand, the telecommunication services in Turkey were provided until
1994 by the state-owned company PTT, a national monopoly providing postal and
telecommunications services. In 1995 Türk Telekom (TT) was legally established
as a state economic enterprise, which is a national monopoly with exclusive rights





 In addition, cable services were provided by TT, which was also
responsible for the radio and television transmitters. Recognising that competi-
tion is the best way to ensure efficient operation and sufficient technological
innovation to keep up with the pace of global change, and that regulation is vital,
Turkey decided to liberalise the telecommunications sector during the 1990s.





 The new legislation initiated the process of deregulat-
ing the sector over the medium term. Competition for fixed-line services was to
be introduced over time. According to the Bill, fixed-line liberalisation was
supposed to occur by the end of 2003, and at the time of liberalisation mobile
and value-added services were to be made truly competitive. A regulatory authority
called the Telecommunications Authority (TA) was established in 2000. Conces-
sions and licences were to be issued by the Ministry of Transport, while preparation
of the documents was delegated to the regulator. Pricing would be a function of
the regulatory body. After the enactment of the legislation the new regulatory board
has been appointed and the decree setting up the authority was published in
August 2000. The legislation further transformed TT into an independent joint-
stock company subject to all provisions of the Turkish Commercial Code in order
to open its capital to private participation. On 12 May, 2001, the Turkish Parlia-
ment passed the new Telecommunications Law, which aims to end state monopoly





 The expiry date for TT’s monopoly was set as the date when the publicly
owned shares of TT would fall under 50 per cent. The government is to keep a
golden share. According to the law 99 per cent of all outstanding shares could be
sold to both Turkish and foreign investors, but the share of foreigners could not
exceed 45 per cent of the outstanding shares. In 2004, foreign ownership limitation
was promulgated by the law numbered 5189. Following the Council of Minister
Decree dated 15 October, 2004, no. 7931, 55 per cent of TT shares was sold to
the highest bidder, Oger Telecoms Joint Venture Group, on 1 July, 2005.
With the latest amendments to the Telecommunications Law concessions and




Between 1994 and 1998 mobile services were provided by the private companies Turkcell and
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consist of licensing operators in the telecommunications sector, setting administra-
tive, financial and technical regulations, performing a follow-up function of these
regulations, issuing technical standards and testing the equipment in accordance
with these standards, and implementing administrative and financial measures to
those who break the rules and regulations. During the last few years, the TA has





 But liberalisation of the telecommunications sector requires that licences
are issued not only to service providers, but also to network providers. In fixed-
line services TT as of 2006 is still a monopoly. After the privatisation of TT the
new company is still a monopoly unless additional licences are issued to other
network providers. Finally, it should be noted that the Turkish licensing regime is
still not parallel to the EU authorisation regulation, since all telecommunication
services and infrastructures are subject to a licence, including services which do
not need scare resources like frequency and numbering.
The TA published the tariff regulation in August 2001, according to which tariffs
will be cost-based, and a ‘price cap’ formula will be applied for the services supplied
by TT. In addition, TA issued two crucial regulations regarding the access regime,
namely the ‘Regulation on Access and Interconnection’ in May 2003 and the
‘Regulation Regarding Local Loop Unbundling’ in July 2004. The Communiqué
entered into force by July 2005. To implement the Ordinance on Access and
Interconnection, the TA approved ‘Principles and Procedures on Accounting
Separation and Cost Accounting’ in February 2004 with a transition period of
two years so that operators having SMP can establish an applicable accounting
separation system in the meantime. The Communiqué regulating administrative,




 on 31 December, 2003. Apart from the above-mentioned regula-
tions, the TA issued implementing regulations on the designation of SMP, numbering,
personal data protection and privacy as well as on ‘Radio and Telecommunica-
tions Terminal Equipment’, and drafted its framework regulation on rights of
way and consumer rights. On the other hand, a new legislation (no. 5369) was
enacted in June 2005 framing the universal services obligations. According to the




Twenty-three licences for Satellite Telecommunication Services, 3 for Satellite Platform Services,
5 for GMPCS Mobile Telephony Services, 14 for Data Transmission Services over Fixed Lines, 91
for Internet Service Providers and 43 licences for Long Distance and International Telephony Services
have been granted so far. In addition, TT was authorised under its Authorisation Agreement with
the Authority to supply many different services such as public switched telephone network (PSTN),
payphones, cable TV, ISDN, ADSL, leased circuits, Internet service provision, etc., and to operate
the telecommunications infrastructure. On the other hand, the three GSM operators provide data
services such as SMS, WAP, GPRS and MMS over intelligent networks, and services with added
value such as geographical information, special invoicing, establishing virtual user platform,
introduction of different structures for schedules of charge and options, voice-mail and GSM-mail.
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call and directory services as a universal service. But there is not any obligatory
requirement for other operators than TT and there is no funding mechanism for




In the following, when considering the welfare effects of integration, we abstract




is adopted liberalisation of the sector will be achieved. This is a simplifica-
tion. But through this simplification the problem can be analysed in two steps. First
we study the linkages between regulatory regimes and performance indicators.
Then we turn to the analysis of the effects of integration in the telecommunica-
tions sector on the Turkish economy. The rest of the section is organised as follows.
While the first subsection is on the relation between regulatory regimes and
performance indicators, the second subsection considers the restrictions prevailing
in the Turkish telecommunications sector during 2005. Finally, the third subsection
analyses the welfare effects of integration in the Turkish economy.
 
a. Regulatory Regimes and Performance Indicators: Review of the Literature
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the market and regulatory environment in
selected EU countries and Turkey as they have prevailed in the telecommunications
sector during the latter half of the 1990s. The table reveals that entry conditions
in trunk (domestic long distance), international and mobile services in Finland,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom had been substantially relaxed, while
Turkey maintained legal monopoly conditions in trunk and international services.
While full-entry liberalisation in the UK occurred during the mid-1980s it was
attained in the Netherlands and Finland during the 1990s, and it was attained in
Turkey only by 2004. While the EU countries did not impose any restrictions on
the FDI flows, restrictions were widespread in Turkey. Moreover, experience
shows that in the transition from monopoly to competition the incumbent public
telecommunications operator (PTO) often maintained a competitive advantage
which could be exploited to preserve a dominant position. While by 1998 the
shares of the largest operators were relatively low in the case of Britain, a first-
mover country, the respective shares were higher in the case of late movers such
as the Netherlands.
A similar pattern is observed in the case of public ownership. While the sector
was transferred completely to the private sector by 1998 in the UK, government
ownership in the sector amounted to 78.8 per cent in the case of Finland, 43.8
per cent in the case of the Netherlands and 100 per cent in the case of Turkey.















































Country Data on European and Turkish Telecommunications, 1998
 
Finland Netherlands United Kingdom Turkey
 
Regulation of Entry and Foreign Investment
Legal conditions of entry
Trunk Open Open Open Licence, 1 firm
International Open Open Open Licence, 1 firm
Mobile Limited by spectrum Limited by spectrum Limited by spectrum Limited by spectrum
Year of liberalisation
Trunk 1993 1997 1985 2004
International 1993 1997 1986 2004
Mobile <1992 1995 1984 1997/98
Foreign investment
Number of competitors – – 7 4
FDI restrictions No No No Yes
Restrictions concerning PTO Yes Yes Yes State control
Market Structure
Basic voice telephony: trunk 20 3 >20 1
Number of licence holders 55 80 76 100
Share of largest operator 40 10 0
Share of second largest operator
Basic voice telephony: international
Number of licence holders 16 3 7 1
Share of largest operator 66 80 49 100
Share of second largest operator 24 16 0
Mobile cellular telephony: analogue
Number of licence holders 1 1 2 1
Share of largest operator 100 100 100
Share of second largest operator 0 0 0
Mobile cellular telephony: digital
Number of licence holders 2 6 4 2
Share of largest operator 69 64 34 75



















































Government ownership 78.8 43.8 0 100






Retail prices No regulation Objective benchmark Objective benchmark Discretionary
Interconnection or access charges Cost of the operator Trunk: Cost of the operator Objective benchmark Cost of the operator
Int.: no regulation
Mobile
Retail prices No regulation No regulation Objective benchmark
Interconnection or access charges No regulation Cost of the operator
Mandatory requirement to publish 
the charges
Yes Yes Yes No
Independence of Regulatory Institutions
Regulatory institutions Independent Telecom. Regulator Independent Telecom. Regulator Independent Telecom. Regulator Competition Authority
Competition Authority Competition Authority Competition Authority Ministry
Ministry Ministry Ministry Other
Division of regulatory responsibilities 
for licensing
Issuing licence Ministry Independent Telecom. Regulator Ministry Ministry
Ministry in the case of mobile
Oversight of licence requirements Ministry Independent Telecom. Regulator Independent Telecom. Regulator Ministry
+ Ministry
Approval of merger Competition Authority Competition Authority Independent Telecom. Regulator
+ Competition Authority
Regulations on interconnection
Authorisation of interconnection 
charges
Independent Telecom. Regulator Independent Telecom. Regulator Independent Telecom. Regulator No authorisation
Dispute resolution Independent Telecom. Regulator Independent Telecom. Regulator Independent Telecom. Regulator Ministry
Regulations on pricing Competition Authority Independent Telecom. Regulator Independent Telecom. Regulator Ministry
Regulations on service quality Independent Telecom. Regulator Independent Telecom. Regulator Independent Telecom. Regulator No monitoring
 
Note:
In Turkey government ownership refers to ownership in telecommunications sector except mobile.
Source: Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) for Finland, Netherlands and United Kingdom, and own estimations for Turkey.
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countries. While Finland does not regulate the retail prices, the Netherlands
and Britain use objective benchmarking in the case of voice telephony. On the
other hand, Finland regulates interconnection charges by cost-based mechanisms.
While the Netherlands regulates interconnection charges in the case of trunk
services, it does not regulate international calls, and Britain uses objective bench-
marking in the case of basic voice services and cost-based mechanisms in
the case of mobile services. Finally, we note that in the three EU countries the
regulators are independent from the legislative and executive bodies, acquiring
a semi-judiciary role. Another interesting feature is that basic competencies are
shared among a ministry department, the sectoral regulator and the competition
authority. While the first two are in general jointly responsible for entry, prices,
dispute resolution and consumer policy, the competition authority has exclusive
competencies for merger activity and applying competition rules. On the other
hand, Turkey by 1998 did not have an independent telecommunications regulator
and all authority was vested in the ministry department. The regulatory authority
in Turkey was established, as emphasised above, by the beginning of 2000.
Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000), using data similar to those reported in Table 1
for the 23 OECD economies over the period 1991–97, assess the effect of individual
regulations and selected non-regulatory variables on measures of performance,
for which they consider price, labour productivity and service quality. The authors
note that the telecommunications sector is a heterogeneous service industry, and
that its services include fixed-voice services (e.g. local, domestic and international
long-distance telephony, and enhanced voice services), mobile services (mobile
access, calls and messaging services), Internet services (e.g. dial-up and web
hosting), data services (e.g. leased lines, asynchronous transfer mode (ATM)
services, public data network services), and content services (e.g. pay-TV, online
information and entertainment). They aggregate these services into five sectors:
local, trunk (domestic long distance), international, mobile (cellular) telephony,
and all other services including leased-line, pay-TV, Internet and data services.
In their study they focus only on trunk, international, mobile and leased-line
services and abstract from consideration in particular of local fixed-voice telephony
services, as the latter, they emphasise, is largely monopolistic in a vast majority
of OECD countries. Using econometric techniques they then estimate the effect









Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) note that telecommunications prices are often two-part, consisting
of a fixed charge that does not vary with use and a variable component that does. The variable
component will often vary with, among other things, the type of service used, the length of use,
the distance, and the time of day and week. Given these considerations, the authors note that some
form of average price across the range of services provided in each sector is needed in order to
undertake empirical work.
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revenue collected in that sector by some measure of output by the sector (e.g.
international call minutes). But for the trunk and leasing sectors, revenue
estimates were not publicly available. Instead they used tariff baskets published
by the OECD to measure prices in those sectors, where the tariff baskets represent
a weighted average of listed prices faced by consumers in each economy for
different products and services in each sector used at different times of the day
and week.
In their econometric models, Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) include five variables
characterising the ‘regulatory’ environments that existed in the telecommunica-
tions industry in OECD economies: the market share of new entrants, an index
of government control of the PTO, the degree of internationalisation of domestic
markets, the time to liberalisation, and the time to privatisation. They include
the ‘market share of new entrants’ variable as an indicator of market structure
and the extent of actual competition, and as a crude proxy for the ease of entry,
which is an outcome of liberalisation in telecommunication services. The ‘index
of government control’ variable indicates the extent of public ownership of the
PTO. The authors use the ‘degree of internationalisation of domestic markets’
variable – the number of foreign telecommunications operators participating in
joint ventures or other cooperation agreements with domestic operators in the
domestic market – to approximate the entry restrictions faced by foreign firms
and the extent of foreign investment. Noting that the announcement of new entry,
or a change in the ownership structure of the PTO, may influence the level and
mix of inputs, outputs and prices well in advance of the actual changes coming
into effect, the authors included a ‘time to liberalisation’ variable and a ‘time to
privatisation’ variable, which respectively measured the number of years to
liberalisation and privatisation. In addition to regulatory variables the authors
include three non-regulatory environmental variables in their models – a measure
of capital intensity, a measure of input costs and a price rebalancing indicator.
The ‘technology’ variable used by the authors – total fixed telecommunications
investment per mainline – is a proxy for capital intensity in the industry. Similarly,
the ‘economic structure’ variable – total operating expenditure per mainline – was
included as a measure of input costs on the grounds that prices will generally reflect
the cost of inputs, such as labour, maintenance and other (non-capital) operating
costs in the industry. Finally, the ‘price rebalancing indicator’, measured by the
distance of price structure from that in the UK in 1998, was included to account
for deviations between underlying costs and prices for individual telecommunica-
tions services.
Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000), investigating the linkages between regulatory
regimes, market environments and performance in domestic long distance, interna-
tional long distance, mobile telecommunications and leased-line services, conclude
that liberalisation of entry and the development of effective competition in
telecommunications services lead to lower prices, higher productivity and better
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quality. An alternative, but in principle a similar approach was adopted by Warren
(2000a), who considers four types of impediments to trade in telecommunica-
tions services: restrictions on cross-border trade, restrictions on establishment,
restrictions on direct investment in fixed and mobile network services, and
restrictions on ongoing operations. In each case Warren derives index values,
where higher values indicate greater restrictions. While the index of restrictions
to cross-border trade captures policies that discriminate against all potential entrants
(domestic and foreign) seeking to supply cross-border telecommunications services,
the index of restrictions on establishment captures policies that discriminate against
all potential entrants (domestic and foreign) seeking to supply the telecommunica-




 The index of restrictions on direct
investment is designed to capture policies that discriminate against potential
foreign entrants seeking to supply telecommunications services via investment
in the country. Finally, the index of restrictions on ongoing operations captures
policies that discriminate against potential foreign entrants seeking to supply
cross-border telecommunications services. Given the index values derived from
an international survey undertaken by the International Telecommunications
Union (1998) for 136 countries, Warren (2000b) estimates first the impact of
impediments to trade and investment in telecommunications services on the
penetration of fixed and mobile telecommunications network and thereafter the
price impact. The results are shown in Table 2.
The table reveals that Finland and the United Kingdom follow liberal trade
and investment policies in the telecommunications sector. Assuming that Turkey
with liberalisation of telecommunications services will implement similar rules
and regulations as those followed by Finland and the UK, we note from Table 2
that with liberalisation Turkish telecommunications prices will be reduced by
33.53 per cent relative to the base case prices.
 
b. Restrictions on the Telecommunications Services during 2005
 




 equivalent of barriers to the telecommunications
services sector in Turkey prevailing during 2005 we calculate the restrictiveness
index following an approach similar to that of McGuire and Schuele (2000) and
Kimura et al. (2003). Tables 3–5 show for fixed-line, mobile services and Internet
services respectively, the restriction categories, weights for them, and scoring for
each category. The weights show the importance of the category in terms of how




The index of restrictions on establishment is derived from scores to the questions: (i) Does




















































Restrictiveness Index Scores for Telecommunications Services
 
Restrictiveness Index Price Effect (Per cent)
Restrictions on Establishment Restrictions on Ongoing Operations Restrictions on Establishment Restrictions on Ongoing Operations
Restrictions on 
Direct Investment 



































Austria 0.1333 0.1333 0.0000 0.0000 0.1333 0.8480 0.8480 0.0000 0.0000 0.8480
Belgium 0.1334 0.1334 0.0667 0.0667 0.2001 0.8710 0.8710 0.4353 0.4353 1.3063
Denmark 0.0333 0.0333 0.0000 0.0000 0.0333 0.1985 0.1985 0.0000 0.0000 0.1985
Finland 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
France 0.2100 0.2100 0.0000 0.0000 0.2100 1.4298 1.4298 0.0000 0.0000 1.4298
Germany 0.0493 0.0493 0.0000 0.0000 0.0493 0.3195 0.3195 0.0000 0.0000 0.3195
Greece 0.1609 0.1609 0.3000 0.3000 0.4609 1.5778 1.5778 2.9424 2.9424 4.5202
Ireland 0.3533 0.3533 0.0000 0.0000 0.3533 2.6655 2.6655 0.0000 0.0000 2.6655
Italy 0.1369 0.1369 0.0000 0.0000 0.1369 1.0019 1.0019 0.0000 0.0000 1.0019
Luxembourg 0.1667 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 1.0458 1.0458 0.0000 0.0000 1.0458
Netherlands 0.0300 0.0300 0.0000 0.0000 0.0300 0.2025 0.2025 0.0000 0.0000 0.2025
Portugal 0.1100 0.1100 0.4000 0.4000 0.5100 1.3473 1.3473 4.8992 4.8992 6.2465
Spain 0.1793 0.1793 0.2333 0.2333 0.4127 1.7099 1.7099 2.2247 2.2247 3.9346
Sweden 0.1000 0.1000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1000 0.6530 0.6530 0.0000 0.0000 0.6530
United Kingdom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Turkey 0.3987 0.3987 0.4000 0.4000 0.7987 16.7384 16.7384 16.7944 16.7944 33.5328
 
Note:
The restrictiveness index scores range from 0 to 1. The higher the score, the greater are the restrictions for an economy.
Source: Australian Productivity Commission (www.pc.gov.au).
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TABLE 3
The Foreign Restrictiveness Index: Restrictions on the Fixed-line Sector in Turkey, 2005
 




Restrictions on Commercial Presence
 
0.20 Licensing of fixed-line services
(a) Regional line service
1.00 1.00 No new licence allowed
0.75 Licences are issued through complicated (discriminately) 
and costly procedures
0.20 Licences are generally issued with application fee and 
several requirements
0.10 Licences are generally issued with application fee
0.00 Licences are automatically issued upon application without 
any cost
(b) Domestic long-distance line service
1.00 No new licence allowed
0.75 Licences are issued through complicated (discriminately) 
and costly procedures
0.20 0.20 Licences are generally issued with application fee and 
several requirements
0.10 Licences are generally issued with application fee
0.00 Licences are automatically issued upon application without 
any cost
(c) International line service
1.00 No new licence allowed
0.75 Licences are issued through complicated (discriminately) 
and costly procedures
0.20 0.20 Licences are generally issued with application fee and 
several requirements
0.10 Licences are generally issued with application fee
0.00 Licences are automatically issued upon application without 
any cost
0.10 Form of commercial presence
(a) Regional line service
1.00 1.00 Measures which restrict or require a specific type of 
establishment
0.00 No restriction on establishment
(b) Domestic long-distance line service
1.00 Measures which restrict or require a specific type of 
establishment
0.00 0.00 No restriction on establishment
(c) International line service
1.00 Measures which restrict or require a specific type of 
establishment
0.00 0.00 No restriction on establishment
0.20 Direct investment: equity participation permitted
0.00 The score is inversely proportional to the maximum equity 
participation permitted in an existing domestic company
0.10 Direct investment: restrictions on certain types of services
1.00 Restrictions on providing some types of telephone services
0.00 0.00 No restrictions on providing any type of telephone services
0.10 Joint-venture arrangements
1.00 Issues no new licence and no entry is allowed through a joint 
venture with a domestic company
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0.50 Foreign company can enter only through a joint venture with a 
domestic company
0.00 0.00 No requirement for foreign companies to enter through a joint 
venture with a domestic company
0.02 Permanent movement of people
1.00 No entry of executives, senior managers and/or specialists
0.80 Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay up to 1 year
0.60 Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay up to 2 years
0.40 Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay up to 3 years
0.20 Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay up to 4 years
0.00 0.00 Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay a period of 




0.10 Third-party resale of lease line
1.00 Resale is not permitted
0.00 0.00 Resale is permitted in any market
0.05 End-user tariff
1.00 End-user tariff is determined by rate of return regulation
0.50 0.50 End-user tariff is determined by price cap established by the authority
0.00 End-user tariff is determined by market force (no regulation)
0.05 Regulation of network interconnection
1.00 Interconnection is completely regulated by the authority
0.50 0.50 Interconnection is determined by private negotiations in general, 
but general terms are determined by the authority
0.00 Interconnection is completely determined by private negotiations 
(no regulation)
0.05 Market structure
(a) Regional line service
1.00 1.00 Monopoly
0.00 Competition among plural providers
(b) Domestic long-distance line service
1.00 Monopoly
0.00 0.00 Competition among plural providers
(c) International line service
1.00 Monopoly
0.00 0.00 Competition among plural providers
0.02 Composition of board of directors
0.00 The score is inversely proportional to the percentage of the board 
that can comprise foreigners
0.01 Temporary movement of people
1.00 No temporary entry of executives, senior managers and/or 
specialists
0.75 Temporary entry of executives, specialists and/or senior managers 
up to 30 days
0.50 Temporary entry of executives, specialists and/or senior managers 
up to 60 days
0.25 Temporary entry of executives, specialists and/or senior managers 
up to 90 days
0.00 0.00 Temporary entry of executives, specialists and/or senior managers 
over 90 days
 
Source: Kimura et al. (2003).
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TABLE 4
The Foreign Restrictiveness Index: Restrictions on the Mobile Services in Turkey, 2005
 




Restrictions on Commercial Presence
 
0.20 Licensing of mobile phone services
1.00 No new licence allowed
0.75 Licences are issued through complicated (discriminately) and 
costly procedures
0.20 0.20 Licences are generally issued with application fee and several 
requirements
0.10 Licences are generally issued with application fee
0.00 Licences are automatically issued upon application without any cost
0.10 Form of commercial presence
1.00 Measures which restrict or require a specific type of establishment
0.00 0.00 No restriction on establishment
0.20 Direct investment: equity participation permitted
0.00 The score is inversely proportional to the maximum equity 
participation permitted in an existing domestic company
0.10 Direct investment: restrictions on certain types of services
1.00 Restrictions on providing some types of telephone services
0.00 0.00 No restrictions on providing any type of telephone services
0.10 Joint-venture arrangements
1.00 Issues no new licence and no entry is allowed through a joint 
venture with a domestic company
0.50 Foreign company can enter only through a joint venture with a 
domestic company
0.00 0.00 No requirement for foreign companies to enter through a joint 
venture with a domestic company
0.02 Permanent movement of people
1.00 No entry of executives, senior managers and/or specialists
0.80 Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay up to 1 year
0.60 Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay up to 2 years
0.40 Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay up to 3 years
0.20 Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay up to 4 years
0.00 0.00 Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay a period of 




0.05 Regulation of interconnection between fixed line and mobile or 
between mobiles
1.00 Interconnection is completely regulated by the authority
0.50 0.50 Interconnection is determined by private negotiations in general, 
but general terms are determined by the authority
0.00 Interconnection is completely determined by private negotiations 
(no regulation)
0.10 End-user tariff
1.00 End-user tariff is determined by rate of return regulation
0.50 End-user tariff is determined by price cap established by the authority
0.00 0.00 End-user tariff is determined by market force (no regulation)
0.05 Allocation of radio spectrum
1.00 Allocation is discriminately decided by the authority
0.20 Allocated by auction with application fee
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TABLE 5
The Foreign Restrictiveness Index: Restrictions on Internet Services in Turkey, 2005
0.10 Allocated by auction without application fee
0.00 0.00 Radio frequencies are obtained with mobile services
0.05 Market structure
1.00 Monopoly
0.00 0.00 Competition among plural providers
0.02 Composition of board of directors
0.00 The score is inversely proportional to the percentage of the board 
that can comprise foreigners
0.01 Temporary movement of people
1.00 No temporary entry of executives, senior managers and/or specialists
0.75 Temporary entry of executives, specialists and/or senior managers 
up to 30 days
0.50 Temporary entry of executives, specialists and/or senior managers 
up to 60 days
0.25 Temporary entry of executives, specialists and/or senior managers 
up to 90 days
0.00 0.00 Temporary entry of executives, specialists and/or senior managers 
over 90 days
 
Source: Kimura et al. (2003).
 




Restrictions on Commercial Presence
 
0.20 Licensing of Internet services
1.00 No new licence allowed
0.75 Licences are issued through complicated (discriminately) and 
costly procedures
0.20 Licences are generally issued with application fee and several 
requirements
0.10 0.10 Licences are generally issued with application fee
0.00 Licences are automatically issued upon application without any cost
0.10 Form of commercial presence
1.00 Measures which restrict or require a specific type of establishment
0.00 0.00 No restriction on establishment
0.20 Direct investment: equity participation permitted
0.00 The score is inversely proportional to the maximum equity 
participation permitted in an existing domestic company
0.10 Direct investment: restrictions on certain types of services
1.00 Restrictions on providing some types of Internet services
0.00 0.00 No restrictions on providing any type of Internet services
0.10 Joint-venture arrangements
1.00 Issues no new licence and no entry is allowed through a joint 
venture with a domestic company
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0.50 Foreign company can enter only through a joint venture with a 
domestic company
0.00 0.00 No requirement for foreign companies to enter through a joint 
venture with a domestic company
0.02 Permanent movement of people
1.00 No entry of executives, senior managers and/or specialists
0.80 Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay up to 1 year
0.60 Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay up to 2 years
0.40 Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay up to 3 years
0.20 Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay up to 4 years
0.00 0.00 Executives, specialists and/or senior managers can stay a period of 




0.10 Regulation of interconnection agreements among Internet service 
providers
1.00 Interconnection is completely regulated by the authority
0.50 Interconnection is determined by private negotiations in general, 
but general terms are determined by the authority
0.00 0.00 Interconnection is completely determined by private negotiations 
(no regulation)
0.10 Infrastructure
1.00 1.00 Providers are not allowed to either build their own network or 
own/lease their international data gateways
0.50 Providers are allowed to build their own network or own/lease 
their international data gateways
0.00 Providers are allowed to build their own network as well as own/
lease their international data gateways
0.05 Market structure
1.00 Monopoly
0.00 0.00 Competition among plural providers
0.02 Composition of board of directors
0.00 The score is inversely proportional to the percentage of the board 
that can comprise foreigners
0.01 Temporary movement of people
1.00 No temporary entry of executives, senior managers and/or 
specialists
0.75 Temporary entry of executives, specialists and/or senior managers 
up to 30 days
0.50 Temporary entry of executives, specialists and/or senior managers 
up to 60 days
0.25 Temporary entry of executives, specialists and/or senior managers 
up to 90 days
0.00 0.00 Temporary entry of executives, specialists and/or senior managers 
over 90 days
 
Source: Kimura et al. (2003).
 












ÇI AND SÜBIDEY TOGAN
 
© 2007 The Authors
Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007
 
entering or operating in the market. The sum of weights for all categories is 1.
A score with a range from 0 (least restrictive) to 1 (most restrictive) is assigned
for each category, according to the degree of restrictiveness, so that the score
reflects the type of restriction imposed by the economy.
In Tables 3–5 the restriction categories are classified into ‘restrictions on
commercial presence’ and ‘other restrictions’. In the case of fixed-line, mobile
and Internet services the ‘restrictions on commercial presence’ include ‘licensing
of fixed-line services’, ‘form of commercial presence’, ‘direct investment: equity
participation permitted’, ‘direct investment: restrictions on certain types of
services’, ‘joint-venture arrangements’ and ‘permanent movement of people’. On
the other hand, ‘other restrictions’ in the case of fixed-line services include ‘third-
party resale of lease line’, ‘end-user tariff’, ‘regulation of network interconnection’,
‘market structure’, ‘composition of board of directors’ and ‘temporary movement
of people’. In the case of mobile services ‘other restrictions’ include ‘allocation
of radio spectrum’ instead of ‘third-party resale of lease line’ of fixed-line services,
and in the case of Internet services ‘other restrictions’ include ‘infrastructure’
instead of ‘third-party resale’ and ‘end-user tariff’ of fixed-line services. Among
restrictions ‘licensing of fixed-line services’ and ‘direct investment: equity
participation permitted’ have a weight of 20 per cent each. These weights
indicate that those barriers are the most important ones.
The tables reveal that in Turkey as of 2005 there are no restrictions on direct
investments and on permanent movement of people. Comparing the restrictions
in fixed-line, mobile and Internet services we note that there are fewer restric-
tions in mobile and Internet services than in fixed-line services.
Table 6 shows the foreign restrictiveness index (FR) values for Turkish fixed-
line, mobile and Internet services. The FR value equals 0.193 in the case of fixed-
line, 0.165 in the case of mobile, and 0.12 in the case of Internet services. To convert
these index values into tariff equivalents we use coefficients presented by Warren
(2000b) that estimate quantity impact and tariff equivalents of restrictions on
fixed-line and mobile service sectors. The regression results obtained by Warren
(2000b) for fixed-line services and mobile services are presented in Table 7.











), household density (number of














), population density (number of persons per square km denoted by pd ) and
measure of trade policy (pf). On the other hand, the penetration rate of the mobile
network (cellular phones per 100 inhabitants denoted by qm) is regressed on y,
pd and measure of trade policy (pm).
Denoting the value of the trade policy variable under full liberalised policy
approach by  the associated value of the dependent variable by  and the
price elasticity of demand by ηi (i = f, m) we note that:
pi*, qi*
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TABLE 6
The Estimated Restrictiveness Indexes




Restrictions on Commercial Presence
0.20 0.093 Licensing of fixed-line services
0.10 0.033 Form of commercial presence
0.20 0.000 Direct investment: equity participation permitted
0.10 0.000 Direct investment: restrictions on certain types of services
0.10 0.000 Joint-venture arrangements
0.02 0.000 Permanent movement of people
Other Restrictions
0.10 0.000 Third-party resale of lease line
0.05 0.025 End-user tariff
0.05 0.025 Regulation of network interconnection
0.05 0.017 Market structure
0.02 0.000 Composition of board of directors
0.01 0.000 Temporary movement of people
Index Value 0.193
Mobile Services
Restrictions on Commercial Presence
0.20 0.040 Licensing of mobile phone services
0.10 0.000 Form of commercial presence
0.20 0.000 Direct investment: equity participation permitted
0.10 0.000 Direct investment: restrictions on certain types of services
0.10 0.000 Joint-venture arrangements
0.02 0.000 Permanent movement of people
Other Restrictions
0.05 0.025 Regulation of interconnection between fixed line and 
mobile or between mobiles
0.10 0.000 End-user tariff
0.05 0.000 Allocation of radio spectrum
0.05 0.000 Market structure
0.02 0.000 Composition of board of directors
0.01 0.000 Temporary movement of people
Index Value 0.065
Internet Services
Restrictions on Commercial Presence
0.20 0.020 Licensing of Internet services
0.10 0.000 Form of commercial presence
0.20 0.000 Direct investment: equity participation permitted
0.10 0.000 Direct investment: restrictions on certain types of services
0.10 0.000 Joint-venture arrangements
0.02 0.000 Permanent movement of people
Other Restrictions
0.10 0.000 Regulation of interconnection agreements among Internet 
service providers
0.10 0.100 Infrastructure
0.05 0.000 Market structure
0.02 0.000 Composition of board of directors
0.01 0.000 Temporary movement of people
Index Value 0.120
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where subscripts f and m refer to fixed-line and mobile services respectively.
Hence, the tariff equivalents (TEi) are obtained as:
9
Based on these equations we calculate ad valorem tariff equivalents of restric-
tions prevailing during 2005 in the fixed-line services as 2.7 per cent, in mobile
services as 3.43 per cent and in Internet services as 1.64 per cent.10 The tariff
equivalent of restrictions in the telecommunications sector obtained as weighted
average of the tariff equivalents of restrictions in fixed-line, mobile and Internet
9 When calculating the values of qi,  and TEi (i = f, m) we use the following values for the
variables: y = US$4,210, hd = 19.2, wait = 2.62 per cent, dshare = 0.9, η  = −1.2 and policy variable
p = (1 − FR). The values of the parameters are obtained from the World Bank (2005), OECD
(2005) and International Telecommunications Union. On the other hand, we get the FR values from
Table 6, the FR values under full liberalisation from Table 2 for the UK and Finland, and the value
of the price elasticity of demand η from Albon et al. (1997).

















































The Estimate Results for the Fixed-line and Mobile Penetration Models
The Fixed Penetration Model The Mobile Penetration Model
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Constant 12.26 2.66 −1.3 0.7
GDP per capita (y) 0.004 0.0003 0.0008 0.00005
y2 −6.30E-08 0.0 −1.90E-09 0.0
y3 1.30E-13 0.0
Household density (hd) 0.003 0.003
Waiting list (wait) −0.08 0.05
Digitised network share (dshare) −0.13 0.03
Population density (pd) 0.001 0.0006
Policy variable (1-FR index) 5.26 3.11
Adjusted R-squared 0.89 0.78
Notes:
Dependent variable for the fixed penetration model: mainlines per 100 inhabitants.
Dependent variable for the mobile penetration model: cellular mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants.
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services weighted by sectoral employment levels is then 2.74 per cent. The
calculations reveal that the Turkish telecommunications sector as of 2005 is
quite liberal, but that further efforts are needed for complete liberalisation of
the sector.
c. Implications of EU Accession
To study the economic effects of EU integration in the telecommunications sector
we compare the situation of the Turkish economy in the base case with the case
when Turkey adopts and implements in the telecommunications sector all of the
rules and regulations of the EU. As the ‘base case’ we consider the Turkish
economy with rules and regulations as they have prevailed during the latter half
of the 1990s, when Turkey did not introduce the EU rules and regulations in the
telecommunications sector. Here we base our analysis of the linkages between
regulatory regimes and performance indicators of Table 2. From the table we
learn that Finland and the UK follow liberal trade and investment policies in the
telecommunications sector. We then assume that Turkey with liberalisation
implements similar rules and regulations as those followed by Finland and the
UK. Table 2 then reveals that with liberalisation Turkish telecommunications
prices will be reduced by 33.53 per cent relative to the base case prices.
Given the change in the price of telecommunications resulting from the
change in the Turkish regulatory regime one can compute the change in Turkish
consumer surplus as a measure of the welfare effect of EU integration from
information on the consumer demand schedule for telecommunications. But
telecommunications is an intermediate good for business users that is used in the
production of other commodities. Hence, prices of other commodities in the
economy will change as a result of the change in the price of telecommunica-
tions. To study the welfare effects of EU integration one has to consider not only
the change in consumer surplus due to the change in the price of telecommunica-
tions but also the changes in consumer surpluses due to the changes in the prices
of other commodities.
To analyse the effect of the change in the price of telecommunications on
the prices of other commodities we consider the 1996 input-output table of the
Turkish economy which has 97 sectors. Telecommunications is sector 83.
Let A be the 97 × 97 matrix of input coefficients. Given A, form the 96 × 96 input
matrix B by deleting the 83rd column and 83rd row referring to the telecommu-
nications sector. Denote the 83rd row where the 83rd column element has been
deleted by e. Let p be the 1 × 96 price vector of the 96 commodities excluding
the telecommunications sector and va the corresponding 1 × 96 unit gross value-
added vector. The price equation can be written as:
p = pB + pte + va,
1134 ERKAN AKDEMIR, ERDEM BAßÇI AND SÜBIDEY TOGAN
© 2007 The Authors
Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007
where pt denotes the price of the telecommunications services. Hence we have:
p = pte(I − B)−1 + va(I − B)−1.
Thus, given the price of telecommunications that will prevail in Turkey after it
adopts and implements the EU rules and regulations, pt, we determine the
equilibrium prices of the other 96 commodities from the above equation assum-
ing that there is no change in the unit gross value-added vector va. Given the
equilibrium price vector p form the 1 × 97 price vector as π = (p pt). Let CON
be the 96 × 1 consumption expenditure vector obtained from the 1996 input-
output table by deleting the value of consumption of the telecommunications
sector and cont the value of consumption of telecommunications services. Form
the 97 × 1 consumption vector as:
Noting that initially all base year prices equal unity we can express the value of
total consumption expenditure evaluated at base prices as:
C = u CONS,
where u denotes the 1 × 97 unit vector. The value of total consumption expenditure
evaluated at the prices that will prevail after Turkey adopts and implements the
EU rules and regulations in the telecommunications sector is then given by:
C* = π CONS.
The effect on consumer welfare can now be calculated as:
(C − C*) × 100/C*.11
Note that this measure of the change in consumer welfare gives a downward-
biased estimate of the welfare effect as we do not consider the increases in con-
sumer demands for the different commodities with the decreases in the prices of
these commodities. But such an estimate would require the use of price elasticities
of demand for the 97 commodities of the input-output table, which we did not
have at our disposal. Thus, the welfare gain will have to be higher than the figure
given by the estimate we present in this paper.
11 Note that this approach determines the equivalent variation in consumer income.
CONS CON
cont
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By construction, prices in 1996, the year the input-output table has been
constructed for, are all unity in the input-output table. We assume that with the
adoption of the EU rules and regulations in the telecommunications sector,
the telecommunications price will decrease by 33.53 per cent, as indicated in
Section 3a. Hence, with the new price of telecommunications we observe that
the welfare of society will increase by 0.587 per cent. Thus, the effect of the
adoption of EU rules and regulations in the telecommunications sector similar to
those of Finland and the UK amounts to a US$1.12 billion annual increase in
the real income of the Turkish consumers. Since, during 1996, consumption formed
72.95 per cent of GDP, the percentage change in welfare of the society is equivalent
to a 0.428 per cent increase in real GDP. Finally, we note that as of 2005 Turkey
has adopted most of the EU rules and regulations in the telecommunications
sector. With further alignment of these rules and regulations to those of the EU
and strict implementation of these rules and regulations by TA, Turkey could
derive the welfare gains calculated above.
Since the estimates of the price wedges due to service barriers are the key
parameters determining the welfare effects of services liberalisation in the above
calculations, we compare our estimates of tariff equivalents with estimates from
other sources. Figures 1 and 2 show respectively the telecommunications prices
for business and residential customers in selected countries. The figures reveal
that the price wedge implicit in these figures are much larger than the figure of
FIGURE 1
OECD Composite Basket of Business Telephone Charges, August 2004 
(Excluding VAT)
Source: OECD (2005).
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33.5 per cent we have used in our calculations.12 Thus, our estimates of price
wedge in the telecommunications sector is rather conservative and our estimate
of the effects of liberalisation in telecommunications services gives the lower
bound of the welfare gains derived in the sector.
On the other hand, we note that there are very few studies on the measurement
of barriers to the telecommunications services sector in Turkey. One such study
has been conducted by Hoekman (1996) who uses information contained in the
country schedules of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
Hoekman’s estimates for Turkey are 92.9 per cent in the basic telecommunica-
tions sector and 42.9 per cent and in the value-added telecommunications
sector.13 But these estimates have, as emphasised by Stern (2002), certain drawbacks.
First, the method assumes that the absence of positive country commitments in
the GATS schedules can be interpreted as indicating the presence of restrictions.
12 The implicit price wedge is derived from the relation p = p*(1 + t), where p refers to the Turkish
price, p* the best-practice price in the EU, and t is the price wedge parameter.
FIGURE 2
OECD Composite Basket of Residential Telephone Charges, August 2004 
(Including VAT)
Source: OECD (2005).
13 Hoekman (1996) constructs frequency ratios on the basis of commitments scheduled in the
GATS. He considers the four modes of supply of the GATS: (i) cross-border supply where a
service is supplied from a supplier’s country of residence to a consumer’s country of residence,
(ii) consumption abroad where a service is supplied through the movement of a consumer to a
supplier’s country of residence, (iii) commercial presence where a service is supplied through the
movement of a commercial organisation to a consumer’s country of residence, and (iv) presence
of a natural person where a service is supplied through the movement of a natural person to a
consumer’s country of residence. He classifies the GATS commitments into three categories,
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Second, the different types of restrictions are given equal weight and are not
distinguished according to their economic impact. Finally, the method assumes
that market access restrictions are the only type of barriers to trade in services.
4. CONCLUSION
The message of this paper is that there is tremendous scope for Turkey to
benefit from adopting and implementing the legislative, regulatory and institu-
tional framework of the EU telecommunications sector. This will lead to an
increase in competition in the Turkish telecommunications sector, lowering
telecommunication prices from their pre-reform levels by about 33.5 per cent,
which in turn will lead to an increase in the GDP of society by 0.428 per cent.
Thus the adoption and implementation of the legislative, regulatory and institu-
tional framework of the EU telecommunications sector is expected to generate
considerable benefits for the economy.
REFERENCES
Albon, R., A. Hardin and P. Dee (1997), Telecommunications Economics and Policy Issues, Industry
Commission Staff Information Paper (Canberra: Productivity Commission, Commonwealth of
Australia).
Boylaud, O. and G. Nicoletti (2000), ‘Regulation, Market Structure and Performance in Telecom-
munications’, Economics Department Working Paper No. 237 (Paris: OECD).
Dee, P. (2003), ‘Services Trade Liberalization in South East European Countries’, Paper prepared
for OECD South Eastern Europe Regional Programme ‘Forum on Trade in Services in South
Eastern Europe’ (Paris: OECD).
Hoekman, B. (1996), ‘Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services’, in W. Martin and
L. A. Winters (eds), The Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
International Telecommunications Union (1998), Telecommunications Reform (Geneva: ITU).
and assigns a numerical score to each category: (i) if no restrictions are applied for a given mode
of supply in a given sector, a value of 1 is assigned, (ii) if no policies are bound for a given mode
of supply in a given sector, a value of 0 is assigned, and (iii) if restrictions are listed for a given
mode of supply in a given sector, a value of 0.5 is assigned. Since there are 155 non-overlapping
service sectors in the GATS classification list, and for each sector there are four possible modes of
supply, a total of 620 such openness/binding factors exist for each member country. Using these
factors, Hoekman calculates frequency ratios to approximate the relative degree of restrictiveness
of market access barriers to services trade across countries. He then establishes a judgemental set
of benchmark tariff equivalents for individual sectors to reflect the degree to which market access
to these sectors is restricted. He assigns a value to each country and sector using the benchmarks
multiplied by the calculated frequency ratio. Thus, if the most restrictive country worldwide had
restrictions equivalent to a 50 per cent tariff, then a country with a 0.9 frequency ratio would have
a tariff equivalent of 45 per cent (i.e. 0.9 times 50).
1138 ERKAN AKDEMIR, ERDEM BAßÇI AND SÜBIDEY TOGAN
© 2007 The Authors
Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007
Kimura, F., M. Ando and T. Fujii (2003), ‘Estimating the Ad Valorem Equivalent of Barriers to
Foreign Direct Investment in the Telecommunications Services Sectors in Russia’, Unpublished
paper (The World Bank).
McGuire, G. and M. Schuele (2000), ‘Restrictiveness of International Trade in Banking Services’,
in C. Findlay and T. Warren (eds.), Impediments to Trade in Services: Measurement and Policy
Implications (London: Routledge).
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005), OECD Communications Outlook
(Paris: OECD).
Stern, R. M. (2002), ‘Quantifying Barriers to Trade in Services’, in B. Hoekman, A. Mattoo and
P. English (eds.), Development, Trade and the WTO: A Handbook (Washington, DC: The World
Bank).
Warren, T. (2000a), ‘The Identification of Impediments to Trade and Investment in Telecommunica-
tions Services’, in C. Findlay and T. Warren (eds.), Impediments to Trade in Services: Measure-
ment and Policy Implications (London: Routledge).
Warren, T. (2000b), ‘The Impact on Output of Impediments to Trade and Investment in
Telecommunications Services’, in C. Findlay and T. Warren (eds.), Impediments to Trade in
Services: Measurement and Policy Implications (London: Routledge).
World Bank (2005), World Development Indicators Online (downloaded on 28 October).
